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China Stages Lehman Event to Curb Runaway Credit

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numble

Member
I think the magnitude of this event was emphasized to me in a blog commentary I saw (posted first in this series).

China this week...

20130619_china6.jpg


US in the run-up to Lehman...
20130619_china5.jpg
we're all Dengists now
http://bloodandtreasure.typepad.com/blood_treasure/2013/06/were-all-dengists-now.html

For many years, critics of China who identify with this mythical phoenix like creature called ‘the markets’ have been telling China that it needs to do something about its debt problem. Eventually Beijing, says ‘Oh, OK’ and deliberately stages – not allows to happen, but deliberately stages – a Lehman event across its banking system. This was not a response to a crisis: the PBOC could have pumped more money into the system this time just as it had done before. It’s an act of will.

And ‘the markets’ promptly crap themselves, though I don’t know if this is actually serious or that ‘granny just saw a flasher’ response that you seem to get a lot of. Actually, what the folk on the trading desks have been exposed to is something that people in China have known for a long time: this is how China solves its problems, with brutal and ruthless fixes. Ok, we have a problem. We also have absolute power. HULK SMASH. Think of this as being in the tradition of the One Child Policy.

This approach is sometimes characterised as Maoism, but it’s really Dengism; the adaptation of all the tools in the Leninist box away from ideological mobilization and towards real world problems. Who cares whether the cat is black or white so long as it’s a fucking huge apex predator?

One thing that can be said for Hu Jintao is that he didn’t really go in for big bang solutions. He just let things go on, or metastasize, nagging from the sidelines about moderate overall prosperity and harmonious societies.

Xi and the new boys have more vigour, whether it’s building 10,000 Stevenages overnight or conducting mass rectification campaigns. Hulk is smashing again. And on this occasion, those of us outside China are on the edge of his fist.
New York Times: Credit Tightens in China as Central Bank Takes a Hard Line
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/b...st-level-in-9-months.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

China’s financial system is in the throes of a cash squeeze as the government tries to restructure the economy and punish speculators, with interbank lending rates spiking on Thursday and bank-to-bank borrowing nearly stalled.

China’s interbank and money market rates have soared over the last two weeks, and banks and other financial institutions are afraid of lending to one another. Without that lending, an economy can quickly stultify. Those in need of short-term cash, or liquidity, must pay dearly or risk default.

China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, has refused to provide large amounts of additional cash to the credit market. Analysts say the government is holding off for a reason: it is trying to reshape the economy while reducing its future role. The bank is not independent, unlike many other central banks, and reports to the State Council.

A huge shadow banking operation has emerged in China in recent years, with smaller banks and trust companies borrowing from bigger state-run banks and relending that money at high interest rates to private companies and property developers, a practice that fuels speculation.

Pressuring speculators is a risky strategy for the Chinese government, which is also grappling with a slowing economy. Many borrowers may have a harder time paying back their loans, and analysts fear the losses could ripple through the banking system.

“The central bank wants to accelerate reform,” said Zhu Haibin, an economist at JPMorgan Chase. “They want to give the market a lesson: you need to manage your risk and not rely on the central bank.”

Mr. Zhu and other economists say restructuring the economy, which has grown addicted to easy money, could be perilous for another reason. The decision could reduce lending and slow growth too quickly.

The worst case, absent intervention by policy makers, would be defaults at lenders with the most exposure and shakiest balance sheets. The damage could spread to other banks, setting off runs on deposits by ordinary Chinese. In the near term, markets will probably continue to be rattled, especially shares in financial institutions.

That was certainly the fear on Thursday around the globe. “China’s interbank market is basically frozen — much like credit markets froze in the United States right after Lehman failed,” said Patrick Chovanec, managing director and chief strategist at Silvercrest Asset Management. “Rates are being quoted, but no transactions are taking place.”

...

China’s policy makers have an arsenal of options at their disposal to inject more money into the financial system, including conducting open market operations — trading in securities to control interest rates or liquidity — or, more drastically, freeing up some of the trillions of renminbi that banks are required to keep on reserve with the central bank, the People’s Bank of China. In the past, when China’s economy has hit a rough patch, the government usually stepped in, forcing state-run banks to pump liquidity into the market, even though there was a risk it could drive up asset prices and lead to overinvestment.

“China’s central bank, by allowing a spike in interbank rates to persist for longer than usual, is sending a message to the market that liquidity needs to tighten and credit growth slow at the margin," Andrew Batson and Joyce Poon, analysts at GaveKal Dragonomics, wrote Thursday in a research note. "Indeed, the central bank has been using its open-market operations to drain liquidity from the interbank market since January, setting the stage for just this kind of showdown with banks.”

If the central bank’s inaction toward the deepening liquidity squeeze is a form of financial brinkmanship, some analysts see it as aimed at reining in smaller banks that had been tapping the interbank market as a source of low-cost funding for their investment in higher-yielding bonds, or to finance off-balance-sheet activities, or shadow banking.

“The P.B.O.C. and some other regulators could be taking the opportunity of the tight funding conditions to ‘punish’ some small banks which had previously taken advantage of the stable interbank rates,"
Ting Lu, China economist at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, said Thursday in a research note.

Mr. Lu said that although the surge in interbank lending rates could have its desired effect on reckless lenders, “it will undoubtedly disrupt both the financial markets and the real economy if the liquidity squeeze lasts too long.”

...

“While the economy faces up to many difficulties and challenges, we must promote financial reform in an orderly way to better serve economic restructuring," China’s State Council, or cabinet, said in a statement Wednesday after a meeting presided over by Mr. Li, according to Xinhua, the state-run news agency.

“The central bank wants to accelerate reform,” said Zhu Haibin, an economist at J.P. Morgan. “They want to give the market a lesson: you need to manage your risk and not rely on the central bank.”

Yu Song, an economist at Goldman Sachs, said in a report Thursday that the government’s decision to tighten liquidity to deal with financial risks could slow growth in the near term. But, he added, “the flip side to this new approach is that the reform measures should reduce systemic risks and possibly raise the level of potential growth.”

...

The surge in interbank lending rates is a similar test for the People’s Bank of China, which, unlike many other central banks, is not independent and reports to the State Council.

The rise in interbank rates began to take off two weeks ago, before China went on a three-day national holiday to observe an ancient dragon boat festival. Banks typically face higher demand for cash before public holidays, and the initial uptick in rates was not considered abnormal at the time.

But as the situation has worsened, the central bank refrained from injecting new money into the system. Benchmark seven-day repurchase rates, another measure of borrowing costs, briefly soared as high as 25 percent on Thursday, up from 8.5 percent on Wednesday, before closing at 11.2 percent.

Bloomberg: China Money Rate Jumps to Record as PBOC Holds Off on Cash Boost
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-...o-record-as-pboc-holds-off-on-cash-boost.html
Chinese banks need to step up efforts to support economic reforms and do more to contain financial risks, the central government said June 19 after a meeting led by Premier Li Keqiang.

“The market’s move is not just because of liquidity but due to a policy stance that won’t change,” said Zhou Hao, a Shanghai-based economist at Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. (ANZ) “After Li’s statement, the market now sees the crunch lasting longer. Until after mid-July, liquidity won’t get better significantly.”

...

“The PBOC clearly has an agenda here,” said Patrick Perret-Green, a former head of Citigroup Inc.’s Asian rates and foreign exchange who works at Mint Partners in London. “To fire a massive warning shot across the banks’ bows and to see who is swimming naked. Moreover, it fits in well with the new disciplinarian approach” adopted by the government, he said.

Chinese regulators are forcing trust funds and wealth managers to shift assets into publicly traded securities as they seek to curb lending that doesn’t involve local banks, so-called shadow banking, according to Fitch Ratings.

The tightening is “emblematic of some of the shadow banking issues coming to the fore as well as some of the tight liquidity associated with wealth management product issuance, and the crackdown on some shadow channels,” Charlene Chu, Fitch’s head of China financial institutions, said in a June 18 interview.

Reuters: China's money rates hit record, central bank squares off with market players
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/20/us-markets-china-bonds-idUSBRE95J10220130620
China's interbank funding costs surged again on Thursday, with the two shortest-term rates hitting record highs, as the central bank again ignored market pressure to inject funds into the market, despite fresh evidence that the economy is slowing.

The People's Bank of China (PBOC) told the market that it would not conduct repo business in its regular open market operations on Thursday, frustrating widespread expectations that it would use reverse repos to inject cash to ease an acute market squeeze over the last two weeks.

The State Council, China's cabinet, reiterated its commitment to prudent monetary policy and moderate credit growth risks at a meeting on Wednesday afternoon.

If money market rates remain high, it could translate into higher financing costs for businesses, economists say.

"The central bank appears to be determined to force banks and other financial institutions, such as funds, brokerages and asset managers, to de-leverage," said a trader at a major Chinese state-owned bank in Shanghai.

"That hardline stance suits the recent government policy of clamping down on non-essential businesses by financial institutions, such as shadow banking, wealth management, trust operations and even arbitrage."

The money market squeeze that began early this month has worsened this week, forcing banks and other financial institutions to trim non-essential businesses, traders said.

The Economist: The Shibor shock - China’s central bank allows a cash crunch to worsen

http://www.economist.com/news/finan...l-bank-allows-cash-crunch-worsen-shibor-shock
The surprise was that the central bank then did little to ease the strain. Instead of printing money and buying stuff, it decided to sell three-month bills on June 18th, withdrawing money from circulation. The amount was tiny. But the signal was clear: no help could be expected from the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). Banks with money to spare chose to hoard their funds, worsening the crunch for others.

Why was the PBOC so hard-nosed? It sets an explicit target for money-supply growth and an implicit target for credit growth. These targets are supposed to be consistent with each other and with economic stability. From its point of view, if banks find themselves short of money they must have provided too much credit. That may well be the case. Although straightforward bank loans are under control, banks have simply invented new ways of lending.

That is regrettable. But it seems odd to use monetary policy to punish banks for behaviour that the regulator should have prevented. With luck the banks will now slow their lending and conserve their cash, at least until they pass quarter-end regulatory reviews. Some banks, however, may flirt with default. A cash crunch is a terribly clumsy way to curb credit growth. In a more mature economy, a central bank could assert itself in clear, calibrated steps by raising its policy rate. In China the PBOC has instead drawn a line in the shifting sands of credit and waited for banks to discover it.



Graphs shamelessly stolen from magenta.


Bloomberg does say that the PBOC has started to make some cash available in the last hour, but the shots have been fired:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-...o-record-as-pboc-holds-off-on-cash-boost.html
 

Mii

Banned
Bullshit they wanted to punish, the insider money got out before the 5th of June.

If this on purpose, they're going to seriously regret the repercussions. Why invest in China when my investment is more secure in the US because they're willing to step in during a crisis?
 

numble

Member
Bullshit they wanted to punish, the smart money got out before the 5th of June.

If this on purpose, they're going to seriously regret the repercussions. Why invest in China when my investment is more secure in the US?
This is for RMB lending, and there are already currency controls for your ability to invest RMB outside of China.
 

numble

Member
Commentary from FT Alphaville

Chinese monetary policy, with Maoist characteristics
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/06/20/1541562/chinese-monetary-policy-with-maoist-characteristics/

We looked earlier on Thursday at whether the PBoC and other Chinese authorities have engineered the recent squeeze in China’s interbank markets (answer: yes) and why they might be choosing this moment to do so (answer: somewhat more complicated).

Chinese interbank rates according to Shibor are incredibly high — and yet, apart from the report of a special ‘targeted liquidity operation’ for the benefit of one, unnamed bank, the central bank appears to be resisting pleas to ease up on liquidity provision.

So, what gives?

Firstly, some background: the PBoC has been talking about risk since December, when it appeared to add ‘controlling risks’ to its short list of policy objectives. Yet by then, the big Chinese banks had already reined in their lending and much credit growth was coming from the country’s growing shadow banking sector. Around the same time the PBoC along with other key financial authorities, including the Ministry of Finance and the banking regulator, also indicated unease with local government financing vehicles, some of which appeared to be tapping non-bank investment products to cover souring debt.

But it was still unclear this was an attempt to rein in the shadow banking sector and credit more broadly, or just to monitor and control it more carefully.

...

The following, from Hexun News via Chinascope Financial, might be illuminating. It describes an executive meeting of the State Council last night chaired by premier Li Kequiang:

+ The Chinese leaders stressed that financial industry plays a key role in China’s stable economic growth, economic restructuring, and social benefits. In order to overcome the difficulties seen in the Chinese economy, the regulators called for fiscal and monetary policy consistency and gradual financial system reform which aims at efficiently allocating credit in the industries with promising growth outlook.
+ The Chinese regulators highlighted at the meeting that new credit granted to small companies, farmers, rural areas, and agriculture industry must maintain at the level in year-ago period; in addition, private capital is encouraged to participate in the reorganization of financial institutions, and the regulators will give green lights to the establishment of privately-owned banks and finance leasing companies.

Fascinating, right? Because it all suggests this is a very deliberate move to direct China’s credit into more effective investments — things that will actually make some kind of return, rather than requiring debt rollovers and the like.


Yet there might be even more to it. Are the PBoC’s efforts part of a broader political shift?

To get a good sense of this, it’s worth reading in full this report by the FT’s Simon Rabinovitch, in Beijing. But here’s a few choice excerpts:

Bankers had been calling for the central bank to ease the pressure and a few investors had even predicted that it might cut interest rates. Instead, the People’s Bank of China ordered a thorough implementation of the new “mass line education” campaign launched this week by President Xi Jinping – a campaign that in its propaganda-style and potential scope carries echoes of the Mao era.

The Communist party cadres that run the central bank were told to attack the “four winds” of “formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and extravagance”, as demanded by Mr Xi.

“It is quite possible that the central bank’s policies have some connection to Xi’s campaign,” said Willy Lam, an expert on Chinese politics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

...
 

numble

Member
Can you guys explain what this means?
I am no expert on this stuff, this is how I read it:

The economy will grow when there is money thrown around everywhere (cheap credit), even when it's spent poorly (in the short term). And you can even cover bad investments by rolling over loans (borrow money to pay for debts that become due).

But government basically turned off all access to cheap money, which would send those banks with the worst investments in a panic, since it becomes harder to rollover their bad loans. This is a signal that they should be putting their money into less risky projects and projects that can earn a good return, that they can't rely on the government from bailing them out of bad loans.
 

numble

Member
Okay, the Washington Post seems to give the best layman's explanation, including global repercussions:

China’s economy is freezing up. How freaked out should we be?
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs...-is-freezing-up-how-freaked-out-should-we-be/

Thursday was a very bad day for China’s economy, the world’s second-largest and a crucial pillar of the global economy, with credit markets freezing up in an unnerving parallel to the first days of the U.S. financial collapse. The question of how bad depends on whom you talk to, how much faith you have in Chinese leaders and, unfortunately, several factors that are largely unknowable. But we do know two things. First, Chinese leaders appear to be causing this problem deliberately, likely to try to avert a much worse problem. And, second, if this continues and even it works, it could see China’s economy finally cool after years of breakneck growth, with serious repercussions for the rest of us.

Things got so bad that the Bank of China has been fighting rumors all day that it defaulted on its loans; if true, this would risk bank runs and more defaults, not unlike the first days of the U.S. financial collapse. There’s no indication that the rumors are true, and no one is running on China’s banks. But the fact that the trouble has even gotten to this point is a sign of how potentially serious this could be.

Here’s what has happened: China’s credit market has been in a bubble for years, with too much lending and borrowing, similar to what happened in the United States during the financial crisis. All that lending helps grow the economy until, one day, the bubble bursts, and it all comes crashing down, as happened the United States. China’s economic growth has been slowing, making a similar a crisis more likely. Chinese leaders seem to be trying to prevent a disaster by basically popping the bubble, a kind of controlled mini-collapse meant to avoid The Big One.

In a real, uncontrolled credit crisis like the U.S. financial meltdown, credit suddenly freezes up, particularly between banks, meaning that the daily loans banks were relying on to do business are suddenly no longer affordable. Banks with too many unsafe loans suddenly owe more money than they can get their hands on, sometimes leading them to default or even collapse. And that means that it suddenly becomes much tougher for everyone else – companies that want to build new factories, families that went to buy a home – to borrow money. That’s an uncontrolled credit crisis, and a number of China-watchers have been worried that China, in its pursuit of constant breakneck growth, could be headed for one.

China’s central bank, which is likely to tamp down all that unsafe lending and over-borrowing before it leads to a crash, appears to have forced an artificial credit crisis.
(It tested a more modest version just two weeks ago.) It looks like the People’s Bank of China has already tightened credit considerably, making it suddenly very difficult for banks to borrow money. Something called the seven-day bond repurchase rate, which indicates “liquidity” or the ease of borrowing money, shot way up to triple what it was two weeks ago.

...

So what happens next? There are four categories of outcome. The first is that Chinese leaders back off on the credit crunch and nothing happens, in which case they’ll probably just try the strategy again later. The second is that they press on and it works miraculously, cleaning out the financial system without causing too much pain. The third is that this spirals out of control, maybe because Beijing underestimated the risk or acted too late, potentially sending the global economy lurching once more. The fourth, and probably most likely, is that this works but is painful, averting catastrophe but slowing the Chinese economy after 20 years of miraculous growth.

China-watchers, who tend to vary widely in their assessments of the country’s economic health, seem to be converging on that fourth scenario, of a painful but necessary slowdown. Nomura, a Japanese investment bank, recently issued a note (via the Financial Times) addressing fears that China could face a financial collapse. Their less-than-comforting caveat: “This is a tricky issue, as the definition of ‘financial crisis’ can differ among investors.” The bank predict that China will not slip into a full-on crisis, citing Beijing’s control over the financial system and unwillingness to let it go under. But the Japanese bank warned: “Nonetheless, we expect a painful deleveraging process in the next few months. Some defaults will likely occur in the manufacturing industry and in non-bank financial institutions.”

If that happens, China’s growth would slow even more. HSBC just cut their prediction for Chinese GDP growth rate from 8.4 percent in 2014 to 7.4 percent, still high but a major drop that could plunge farther. This would be difficult for China, which has built its economy – and political stability – on keeping high economic growth. Recall that the U.S. financial collapse was disastrous for America’s already unhealthy economic sectors: city budgets, real estate, news media. Something similar could happen in China, which is also facing a massive property bubble. All of this could also be dire for the rest of the world, which is heavily linked to China’s economy and is still struggling to recover from the U.S. and European crises. Japan could be particularly vulnerable.

But believe it or not, if all of this occurs, it might actually be good news. It could well avert a much more serious, uncontrolled Chinese financial collapse. The nation’s central bank has been successful in controlling market shocks like this, throwing around lots of money when it needs to. Officials seem to know what they’re doing; an experienced China-watcher I talked to called it “one step back, two steps forward.”

Still, we’ve got to step back before we can step forward, and the time between steps could be tough on a global economy that doesn’t need any more strain.
 

Suikoguy

I whinny my fervor lowly, for his length is not as great as those of the Hylian war stallions
I do think they waited too long, and this, if they follow through, is going to do more damage then China is expecting.
 
Very interesting read


Anyone catch that Vice episode of china where they were visiting these ghost towns which were town if newly constructed buildings that were unoccupied, all funded by government
 

numble

Member
The banks are lending again, but at high rates to continue to push for deleveraging:

Financial Times: China steps back from severe cash crunch
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3f468d04-da2a-11e2-98fa-00144feab7de.html#axzz2WpBxg5g9

China pulled back from the brink of a severe cash crunch on Friday, with money rates falling after reports that the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, had acted to alleviate market stresses.

Nevertheless, interbank conditions remained tight and analysts said the PBoC would continue its hard line of recent days to compel financial institutions to pare back their leverage.

Local media reported that the central bank had provided targeted cash injections to the country’s biggest banks after the interbank market almost froze on Thursday, though there was no official announcement of any special provisions.

One bond trader told the Financial Times that the PBoC had given verbal instructions to major banks to resume lending to each other, in order to get the interbank market working again.

The seven-day bond repurchase rate, a key measure of liquidity, fell 227 basis points to 8.5 per cent, indicating that the threat of an acute financial crisis had significantly receded.

But short-term lending rates remained roughly double their normal level – high enough to cause serious pain for over-leveraged financial institutions. The central bank has steadfastly refused to conduct any large-scale, system-wide cash injections over the past week despite calls for help from lenders.

The Shanghai Composite Index, the country’s main stock index, fell nearly 1 per cent in the morning trading session, adding to its 7 per cent tumble over the past two weeks.

“We maintain our view that the monetary policy stance will remain tight, at least until the second-quarter GDP release on July 15,” said Zhang Zhiwei, an economist with Nomura Securities.

“We believe that recent action by the PBoC reflects the government’s determination to take aggressive action to contain financial risks,” he added.

Overall credit has grown by about 22-23 per cent in China this year, up from 20 per cent in 2012, after a surge in “shadow” lending by trust companies and banks through off-balance-sheet vehicles.

That has added to an already-rapid accumulation of leverage in the economy. The overall credit-to-gross domestic product ratio has jumped from roughly 120 per cent five years ago to closer to 200 per cent today.

“We believe that the PBoC is acting in line with the government’s efforts to deleverage, rebalance and position the economy towards a path for sustainable growth,” analysts with Barclays said in a note.

“Though we believe that the PBoC is likely to stabilise the interbank market in the near term, short-term rates are likely to remain elevated, at least for a while, possibly leading to the failing of some smaller financial institutions.”
 

Burt

Member
Even as someone who majored in Chinese and international business and whose career is somewhat dependent on the Chinese market, I can't help but smirk at this, and have some part of me hope it all falls apart. They need to learn they can't cheat and skirt by on the skin of their teeth forever. They need a fucking wake up call.
 

numble

Member
What's most of this risky lending spent on?

probably construction
Poorly regulated wealth management products that in a worse case scenario are a couple steps away from a Madoff like Ponzi scheme fueled by constantly rolling over credit, some critics also compare them to the collateralized debt obligations:

http://www.economist.com/news/finan...roducts-reflects-deeper-financial-distortions
But the most important institutions are China’s 67 trust companies, lightly regulated finance firms that make loans and other investments but cannot collect deposits. And the most significant instruments are the uncountable wealth-management products (WMPs), which raise money from better-off investors, in large increments (at least 50,000 yuan, about $8,160) and for short periods (typically less than six months, sometimes much less).

...

As well as midwifing loans from one firm to another, trust companies also raise pools of money from investors by issuing their own WMPs. These products amounted to 1.9 trillion yuan at the end of 2012. Most mature within 1-3 years, according to Jason Bedford of KPMG, an auditing firm. The money is often invested in loans to credit-starved enterprises. Some products are, however, more imaginative, speculating on tea, spirits, or even graveyards. In at least one case, a product was not just imaginative but entirely imaginary: raising money for a non-existent project dreamed up by a rogue trust-company manager.

These products are, then, risky. But potential losses are cushioned by collateral and unmagnified by leverage, Mr Bedford points out. In principle these losses are also borne by investors. The buyers of two faltering products issued by CITIC Trust, China’s largest trust company, have been told not to expect a bail-out. In practice, however, many trusts are less stiff-spined. They are tempted to rescue investors to maintain their good name.

Often, these trust products are sold through banks, which distribute them, without guaranteeing them. The public, however, “pretends not to understand the distinction”, Mr Zhang says. By feigning ignorance, aggrieved investors hope to browbeat the government into holding the banks liable, he argues. In Hong Kong banks had to ease the pain of losses on Lehman minibonds sold through their branches. It is notable that one of the banks involved, Bank of China, has been unusually reluctant to sell WMPs in the mainland, points out Mike Werner of Sanford C. Bernstein, a research firm.

Trust products sold by banks tend to be confused with a less risky kind of WMP: bank products packaged by trusts. In the first case, Mr Bedford explains, the bank provides a service to the trust companies, offering its staff and branches as a distribution channel. In the second case, the roles are reversed: trust companies and, increasingly, securities companies, provide a service to the bank, helping it to package assets in its WMPs.

Unlike trust products sold by banks, bank products packaged by trusts are fairly conservative. They are mostly “deposits in disguise”, as Standard & Poor’s put it, offering yields one or two percentage points higher than the deposit-rate ceiling. As well as helping banks to breach this ceiling, these products allow banks to window-dress their balance-sheets, points out Mr Werner. The WMPs are typically timed to mature just before the end of each quarter. As the money is returned to the WMP-buyers, it is paid into their deposits at the bank, just in time to bring the bank’s loan-deposit ratio below the regulatory limit of 75%.

If enough of the riskier WMPs fail, it might prompt investors to stop buying fresh products. Since WMPs usually mature long before the underlying assets do, that could inflict a nasty credit crunch on otherwise solvent ventures. But the impact on the banking system would be less obvious. If investors lose confidence in WMPs, they are likely to switch to deposits instead. The result would be a run to the banks, not a run on them. The only worry is that investors may not run to the same banks that issued most of the WMPs. China’s smaller joint-stock banks, which have led WMPs issuance, could therefore face a funding squeeze.

One answer would be to introduce formal deposit insurance. That would force banks to pay for the implicit backing they enjoy from the state. It would instil confidence in the smaller banks, as well as the ones that are obviously too big to fail. It would also draw a clearer distinction between safety (insured deposits) and risk (uninsured investments).

Critics of China’s shadow banking like to compare WMPs to the collateralised debt obligations at the heart of the global financial crisis. But according to Ting Lu of Merrill Lynch, the banks’ WMPs bear a closer resemblance to American money-market funds, investing mostly in safe, liquid, short-term paper. Those funds, which first arrived in America in 1971, competed successfully with bank deposits, forcing legislators to phase out America’s caps on deposit interest rates in the 1980s. Perhaps the banks’ WMPs will prove a similar spur to reform in China.
 

Irnbru

Member
It all comes down to commercial paper, it just seems like a US crash event but on a scale of projects and construction credit (rolling over debts for project after project) then the housing market crash, completely fascinating. What's interesting is the way the government is approaching the problem by letting the market fix itself instead of bailing it out, would make for a good case study vs. The way the us handled our last bubble burst.
 

numble

Member
It all comes down to commercial paper, it just seems like a US crash event but on a scale of projects and construction credit (rolling over debts for project after project) then the housing market crash, completely fascinating. What's interesting is the way the government is approaching the problem by letting the market fix itself instead of bailing it out, would make for a good case study vs. The way the us handled our last bubble burst.
They also did something similar 2 weeks ago (you can see it on the graph). It is an artificial "crash," since they opened up lending again. I suppose they will keep doing this to force banks to slowly wean banks off of the addiction to credit. In a sense it is a different sort of bailing out before-the-fact, forcing banks to stop taking up risky investments before there's a real unplanned and gigantic crash.
 

numble

Member
Lending has unfrozen, but at higher rates. Also includes some commentary about how this will probably halt a spiral into crazier lending practices, like what happened in the US:

New York Times: China’s Credit Squeeze Relaxes as Interest Rates Drop
BEIJING — China’s credit crunch eased Friday after lending picked up among banks and financial institutions that had been desperately seeking cash in the bank-to-bank market.

The central government made no official announcement on the situation, and it was unclear whether policy makers had intervened, but short-term interest rates fell sharply Friday from a day earlier, when they had reached some of the highest levels in a decade.

Still, the Chinese financial markets remained under pressure. Rates for institutions that were seeking interbank funding on Friday were still substantially higher than a few weeks ago. Financial experts expressed skepticism that the government would do more to aid banks that were temporarily starved for cash.

The reluctance of policy makers to act comes amid growing concerns that China’s economy is weakening and that the government has abandoned its longstanding policy of responding to any hint of an economic slowdown by expanding credit.

By signaling a new restraint in monetary policy, Beijing seems to be tackling what analysts say is the growing risk of poor lending practices and overcapacity in the economy.

Louis Kuijs, an economist at the Royal Bank of Scotland, said Friday that the government’s response to weak cash flows in the interbank market, where banks make short-term loans to one another, was a sign of the government’s new resolve.

“It was the shift in the stance of the P.B.C. that made all the difference,” he said, referring to the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, acting in a way that had sent interest rates higher. “The government at the moment wants to signal, ‘we’re working on reform — we’re not interested in short-term stimulus,’ like China did in the past.”

The apparent decision not to pump more cash into the economy rocked China’s financial markets Thursday. Investor worries were compounded by newly released economic data indicating that manufacturing activity was contracting and export and job growth were tepid.

As credit markets began to freeze up and mistrust among banks spread, rumors circulated of defaults. Late Thursday, the Bank of China, one of the country’s biggest lenders, issued a statement on its Web site denying local news reports that it had defaulted on interbank payments.

By late Friday, the markets had settled somewhat. The overnight lending rate between banks had dropped to 8.49 percent, down from a record high of 13.44 percent on Thursday, but still much higher than last month’s levels of less than 4 percent.

Another benchmark rate for borrowing costs between banks, the seven-day repurchase rate, opened Friday at 8.1 percent, briefly soared as high as 25 percent and closed at 5.5 percent.

Few analysts expect the liquidity strains to lead to a financial or economic crisis because Beijing has the tools to avert a serious slowdown, with its tight control over the banking and financial sector.

But experts say the risks are rising and the choices are grim: if the government pulls back on lending, the economy could suffer in the short term; if it pumps more money into the economy to avert a slowdown, it could do long-term damage to an economy that many believe is already suffering from overinvestment.

There are also growing concerns about China’s huge shadow banking sector, with some financial experts warning of hidden liabilities tied up in local government projects, as well as the so-called wealth management products that are sold to investors through banks and trust funds but do not appear on the financial companies’ balance sheets.

“Persistent tight liquidity conditions in China’s financial sector could constrain the ability of some banks to meet upcoming obligations on maturing wealth management products on a timely basis,” the credit ratings agency Fitch Ratings said in a report Friday.


Joe Zhang, a longtime banker and the author of “Inside China’s Shadow Banking: the Next Subprime Crisis?,” said the decision by China’s central bank to discipline banks by allowing the rates to rise this week was necessary.

“Effectively, they are telling commercial banks to go and sort out their problems,” he said in a telephone interview Friday. “The banks have lent out too much money. And what happens over time? You go from prime to subprime to silly loans. This is what happened with the U.S. subprime crisis. Banks start lending to bad projects. We’ve been too reckless.”
 

numble

Member
Reuters goes into detail on the wealth management products (WMPs) that many have likened to the collateralized debt obligations that created the US financial crisis:


Reuters - Analysis: China cash squeeze exposes risks from short-term funding

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/21/us-china-credit-idUSBRE95K0CM20130621

The mirror that China's central bank is holding up in front of the country's banks is providing uncomfortable viewing. Too many banks are reliant on short-term funding markets to survive, and a shake up in the sector is needed.

The central bank has engineered the current cash crunch as a warning to overextended banks but a growing concern, analysts say, is of a miscalculation that sets off a full-blown crisis.

The central bank's determination to rein in rapid credit growth has sent interbank lending rates soaring to record highs, sparking panic and swirling speculation that banks are defaulting on deals as they scramble to secure short-term funds.

Analysts suspect a particular target of the central bank is non-bank lending, or shadow banking, which has boomed in recent years.

"A more structural factor behind this squeeze is that banks are using liquidity tools to support their long-term business. That should be a strong warning sign for the industry," said Hu Bin, senior China banking analyst at Moody's Investor Service in Hong Kong.

In particular, Hu says, some banks are relying on short-term interbank borrowing to come up with the cash necessary to meet repayment obligations on high-yielding investment products, a similar reliance that caused problems for some Western banks during the global financial crisis.

"Everyone in the system is impacted by this, even all the way at the top in terms of the largest banks in the country," said Charlene Chu, senior director at Fitch Ratings.

"It's certainly a lot more swift and arguably more effective in reining in the growth of shadow credit. But it does create a lot of repayment risk within the system between financial institutions and there is potential for unintended consequences."

Overall financing in the Chinese economy increased 52 percent in the first five months of 2013 compared to the same period last year, which analysts say was led by a surge in shadow banking activity and wealth management products that promised investors high returns.

Fitch estimated that total sales of wealth management products reached 13 trillion yuan by the end of the 2012, more than 16 percent of total bank deposits.

More immediately, it estimated that more than 1.5 trillion yuan in wealth management products will mature in the last 10 days of June. That may explain the scramble by some banks to secure short-term funds, which are often used to meet the repayment obligations.

WEALTH PRODUCT BOOM

Banks have created wealth products by packaging various assets like money market deposits, corporate bonds and informally securitized loans.

Many of these products are held off-balance-sheet, which allows banks to meet state-mandated loan-to-deposit ratios and still create new loans.

Many are also based on long-dated assets, so when payouts are due to investors, banks often raise cash by issuing new products - or by borrowing in the interbank market.

Authorities have tried to regulate the shadow banking sector and in particular these wealth management products but with little impact on the sector's growth. Now the central bank is playing hard ball with the banks by refusing to provide liquidity to the money markets, which this week drove the interest rate for some banks to borrow short-term funds to 25 percent or higher.


"The critical question now is how long is this going to go on," said Fitch's Chu on the sidelines of a conference in Sydney. "If this is going on for quite a while and we really start to get a shake out of institutions, the question is what potentially would they do to try and address some of that and would consolidation be on the radar screen."

Smaller banks, whose less extensive branch networks give them less access to customer deposits, are especially vulnerable to the credit squeeze.

At the end of 2012, interbank assets accounted for 25 percent of the total assets of mid-sized banks examined by Michael Werner, senior bank analyst at Bernstein Research. That compared with 15 percent in 2009, he said in a report this month.

Therefore, a wave of defaults on interbank loans could seriously threaten the solvency of smaller banks, he said.

"Speaking with a lot of Chinese banks, you often hear, 'this is not a risk because these loans always get repaid.' I think that type of mentality is going to get thrown out the door," Werner said.

At the end of 2012, mid-sized Minsheng Bank's (600016.SS) (1988.HK) interbank funding of less than one year accounted for 29 percent of its non-equity liabilities, the highest among the Chinese banks that Bernstein covers.

Werner says other mid-sized banks like Everbright Bank (0165.HK)(601818.SS), Industrial Bank (601166.SS), and Ping An Bank (000001.SZ) are also highly dependent on short-term borrowing.

To be sure, the level of reliance on short-term funding is no where near the levels of some Western banks before the global credit crunch. Short-term funding may have accounted for more than half of such liabilities at Lehman Brothers at the end of 2007, a research paper by staff economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York showed in 2010. Lehman's collapse set off the global financial tsunami.

REFORM

Banks that find themselves overly reliant on short-term funding face a choice: they can shrink their balance sheets so that more assets are funded by deposits, or they find other more stable funding sources.

If they choose the latter, equity and long-term debt are possibilities. But resorting to these more expensive funding sources would pressure banks' net interest margins, hurting profitability.

China's central bank appears to prefer de-leveraging.


"The central bank appears to be determined to force banks and other financial institutions, such as funds, brokerages and asset managers, to de-leverage," said a trader at a major Chinese state-owned bank in Shanghai.

"That hardline stance suits the recent government policy of clamping down on non-essential businesses by financial institutions, such as shadow banking, wealth management, trust operations and even arbitrage," he said.

An article in a China central-bank backed newspaper called the Financial Times suggested the cash crunch and a rumored default had provided impetus for China to accelerate the roll-out of a new deposit insurance system.

Such a system would eliminate the need for authorities to bail out individual banks by ensuring that depositors were protected even if a bank found itself short of funds.
 

numble

Member
I don't know why there's so little discussion--I find this all very fascinating. Anyway, some more analysis from The Atlantic:

The Atlantic: China Has Engineered a Financial Crisis — And it Might Work
http://www.theatlantic.com/china/ar...-a-financial-crisis-and-it-might-work/277099/

China has been cracking down on dodgy financial instruments this year by starving banks of cash. It's a little like taking a bunch of heroin addicts and making them go cold turkey -- the cure could kill them. And at first glance, it looks like the People's Bank of China engineered a crisis that is dangerously similar to the one that precipitated global economic doom in 2008. But in this case, it might actually work.

Usually the government responds to such cash crunches by pumping more money into the financial system. This year, it refused.

Back during the 2008 financial crisis, China's central bank injected trillions of dollars into the system to stave off a recession. This accelerated China's infrastructure build-out and saved the country from the worst of the slowdown. But all of that cash also created a massive shadow banking sector comprised of off-balance sheet wealth management products (WMPs) promising massive returns.

China's new leaders have been cracking down on WMPs and making portentous policy statements about "controlling risk." And this week, as banks embarked on their usual pre-audit balance sheet makeovers, it applied the screws: It held back its usual infusion of liquidity, driving the interest rates on repurchase transactions (which are essentially loans between financial institutions) to record heights.

Crucially, analysts think that WMPs use those repo transactions to pad their results. The FT cited Mike Werner of Alliance Bernstein, who wrote, "We have long argued (and had our suspicions confirmed by individuals at the banks) that some wealth management products will borrow money from the banks at quarter-end to repay investors."

If you're a fund manager running a dodgy WMP, what better way to hide your inferior results than to borrow cheap money from a bank at the end of every quarter, especially if the bank is a large investor in your WMP? It would be like Bernie Madoff getting an ultra-low interest loan at the end of every month -- he could have kept his scam going indefinitely.


That's the practice that China's central bank was likely trying to stop with its engineered credit squeeze. It also punished lenders who have taken on too much debt and who relied on short term repo agreements to prop up their balance sheets. We can't know for sure, of course, since the People's Bank of China and the rest of the country's financial policymakers are obsessively secretive about their methods. But it's a reasonable explanation, and is emerging as the consensus view.

Broadly speaking, China's crackdown has been successful -- WMP issuance has fallen. This week's brinksmanship was a harsher corrective, and the results are too early to call. Although it generated some scary headlines, there was not much actual risk that a major bank would keel over from the strain
-- even so, Bank of China had to issue a denial that it defaulted on its obligations on Thursday afternoon. But Beijing has enough cash stored away to bail out its banking sector if it really had to.

On Friday, PBoC relented and added 50 billion RMB ($8.2 billion) in liquidity to the financial system. Along with rumors that it ordered the country's largest banks to free up money for the banking system, that brought sky-high inter-bank interest rates back to earth. Still, combined with the U.S. Federal Reserves' market-roiling announcement that it will start to end its quantitative easing program, it made for a bracing week of financial drama -- and it signaled that China's leaders are not averse to causing a bit of drama to underscore their desire for reform in the financial industry.

"As their tenure will last for 10 years, they are willing to tolerate some short-term pain in order to achieve long-term policy objectives -- preventing financial crisis and delivering sustainable growth,"
the Japanese bank Nomura said in a research note. It predicted that defaults in Chinese manufacturing companies and non-bank financial institutions were imminent in the coming months.
 

magenta

Member
I don't think it is right to call this a 'Lehman Event'. That would imply a large financial institution failing and going into bankruptcy, which has not happened (yet).
 

TCRS

Banned

numble

Member
I don't think it is right to call this a 'Lehman Event'. That would imply a large financial institution failing and going into bankruptcy, which has not happened (yet).

Well, it's similar in the sense that credit markets were completely frozen. I doubt we'll see a large bankruptcy with cascading effects, since the numbers don't match up to the numbers we saw at the US financial crisis (dependence on short term funding ~25% vs ~50% at the height of the US crisis). This event (maybe successive similar vents, or a continually tight credit market) will force institutions to deleverage.

It's only fascinating if you're into this sort of thing. But it really is. At least someone is regulating shit and is not afraid to pull out the big guns.

Maybe, but the previous thread on China's runaway credit had like quadruple the number of posts, as are the many other "China bubble" threads that pop up from time to time. I would've thought the interest in those stories would translate to interest in this story.

There's also discussions to be had about comparing it to the US credit crisis, and the nature of power/politics in China itself, especially since everyone sees this as leading to lower growth and some pain to the economy, something many believed that the government pursued at all costs.
 

Zajora

Member
I don't really know that much about this sort of thing, but this definitely is interesting. You've just sent me into a Wikipedia time-sink that ended in me reading about Chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy code.
 

Ether_Snake

安安安安安安安安安安安安安安安
They also did something similar 2 weeks ago (you can see it on the graph). It is an artificial "crash," since they opened up lending again. I suppose they will keep doing this to force banks to slowly wean banks off of the addiction to credit. In a sense it is a different sort of bailing out before-the-fact, forcing banks to stop taking up risky investments before there's a real unplanned and gigantic crash.

Why would they even care? People in charge of money will just move their own money to a safe house and keep punching the slot machine. When it breaks they'll catch a cab. Nobody's life is on the line, so whatever is done nothing will stop them. Crash is inevitable, it's just changing hands like a hot potato.
 

numble

Member
Why would they even care? People in charge of money will just move their own money to a safe house and keep punching the slot machine. When it breaks they'll catch a cab. Nobody's life is on the line, so whatever is done nothing will stop them. Crash is inevitable, it's just changing hands like a hot potato.
So how do you explain these actions if you don't think they care? Why did they engage in market reforms after 1979? There is speculation from NYT's Bill Bishop that they're going to take a look at which institutions were in the most stress on Thursday, and punish the heads of the worst off: https://twitter.com/niubi/status/347927330829791232
https://twitter.com/niubi/status/347927552293232640

Unlike the US, executives that are reckless often face the death penalty.

I don't see how a crash is inevitable when they triggered these artificial stresses well before banks reached Lehman-like levels of credit reliance.
 
Maybe, but the previous thread on China's runaway credit had like quadruple the number of posts, as are the many other "China bubble" threads that pop up from time to time. I would've thought the interest in those stories would translate to interest in this story.
people are interested in circle jerks, not substantively discussing an issue. your thread is content-heavy and thus more difficult to turn into an ignorant fear-mongering circle jerk. if you want more replies, quote an inflammatory article from the daily mail, highlight a few relevant sections, and then make a sarcastic comment to frame the discussion.
 

numble

Member
Here is a really great article from NYT's Chris Buckley that puts it in the a much larger perspective, though the title is kind of hokey (seems like they added that bit to draw readers):

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/w...wdown-with-himself.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print
China’s New President Sets Up a Potential Showdown, With Himself
By CHRIS BUCKLEY

The turbulence that struck China’s banks this week is the latest episode in a political drama likely to play out in coming months: President Xi versus President Xi.

The country’s new leader, Xi Jinping, has ignited expectations of bold economic liberalization, but he has also cast himself as a resolute defender of Communist Party control, leaving even insiders uncertain about how far he will push changes that could strain the webs of state patronage and unsettle the stability that he and many other officials also prize.

The changes proposed by some Chinese officials include rolling back certain state controls on prices of energy and natural resources, encouraging private business in industries long dominated by state conglomerates and bringing more market competition into the financial sector.

But such ambitions could falter in the face of opposition from other officials and state-owned companies, as well as the concerns of party leaders about social instability and slowing growth. The turmoil of bank-to-bank loans is but one example of the kind of economic jitters and pitfalls that Mr. Xi and his colleagues could confront as they grapple with these policy choices, analysts said.


“So much risk has already been accumulated, but they need to avoid panic while pushing forward real reforms,” said Tao Ran, an economics professor and director of the China Center for Public Economics and Governance at Renmin University in Beijing. “It’s politically very difficult.”

The interest rates that banks charge to lend to each other shot up Thursday and lending between banks nearly seized up after the People’s Bank of China uncharacteristically failed to intervene to relieve a cash squeeze. The move seemed to be part of the government’s effort to force state banks to cut lending to inefficient or risk-laden programs favored by local officials and politically connected investors, many of them state-owned companies.

On Friday, the People’s Bank of China appeared to retreat a bit from its hard-line stance, and financial industry executives said the central bank was releasing more money for lenders, calming investors whose worries about China’s growth had rippled across stock markets. Bank-to-bank rates climbed down from Thursday’s record highs, but the situation remained volatile.

“I thought that was a show of policy makers’ determination,” Yiping Huang, chief economist for emerging Asia at Barclays Capital in Hong Kong, said of the cash crunch. “They want to impose some near-term pain for long-term benefits. What they are doing is preparing steps for liberalization and, hopefully, for better market discipline.”

In China, the Communist Party’s power rests on a marriage of political and economic control, but Prime Minister Li Keqiang and other officials have said market liberalization is needed to foster new sources of growth.

Yet those changes could require painful, even risky, surgery on the party’s limbs of power: state-owned banks, local governments, and companies and investment vehicles controlled by the government. And that is the conundrum facing China’s leaders: they want to maintain the growth needed to satisfy an increasingly prosperous and vociferous society, yet worry that the proposed changes could erode the political reach and stability they see as underpinning one-party rule.

“Economic reform, I mean real reform, undoubtedly now involves questions about the political system, because excessive state power is a key issue,” said Deng Yuwen, who was dismissed this year as an editor at a party newspaper, The Study Times, after bluntly criticizing state policies.

Mr. Xi, as party leader, must come up with at least part of his answer to these questions by autumn, when the party’s Central Committee gathers. With slightly more than 200 senior officials as full, voting members, the committee meets in seclusion at least once a year to approve policy priorities. This meeting, or plenum, is the third for this cohort of the committee — by custom, third plenums set the direction for economic policy — and Mr. Xi and other officials have indicated that they want this gathering to unveil major changes.

“The plenum is going to be a watershed one way or another,” said Christopher K. Johnson, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “Either because of what it says about the direction of reform or about the degree of stagnation in the party.”

The most famous third plenum, in 1978, is portrayed by the party as the start of Deng Xiaoping’s transformative era. Mr. Xi appears to hope that the next plenum will give him some of Mr. Deng’s aura. He has assigned Liu He, an adviser who advocates faster steps toward a market economy, to prepare for the meeting, said a Chinese businessman close to several leaders. He spoke on condition of anonymity to protect his access to officials.

Mr. Xi told President Obama in California this month that he was determined to remold the Chinese economy. “We must deepen reforms to promote healthy and sustained economic development,” Mr. Xi told Mr. Obama, according to Xinhua, the state-run news agency.

Mr. Liu is overseeing teams of officials and researchers developing proposals that may be endorsed at the Central Committee meeting later this year. According to the Chinese businessman who requested anonymity, those proposals include gradually freeing bank interest rates from state controls; lifting barriers preventing rural residents from being officially absorbed into cities; allowing private companies to invest in some sectors until now controlled by state companies; and giving competition a bigger role in setting prices for natural resources and energy.

“These may not be the final programs to be implemented, but these are organized by the government, so that at least shows to me that they’re serious and determined to make changes,” said Mr. Huang, the Barclays economist, who has also described the proposed changes.


Mr. Liu’s roles include running the office of an elite party group that steers economic policy. Now 61, he studied at Seton Hall University for a year and graduated from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard with a master’s in public administration in 1995.

“I think there’s no question: Liu He is clearly pro-market,” said Barry J. Naughton, a professor at the University of California in San Diego who studies Chinese economic policy.

Nor is Mr. Liu the lone voice advocating market overhauls. Mr. Li, the prime minister, has praised market competition and the private sector, and Lou Jiwei, the finance minister, has advocated financial liberalization.


Yet the Chinese government’s economic agenda is rife with tensions about the pace, focus and sequence of possible changes. “People may shout the same slogans, but there’s a lot of controversy over just what needs reforming,” said Hua Sheng, an economist at Southeast University, in Nanjing, China, who has been a prominent voice in policy debates.

Senior officials have put off considering at the coming plenum how to deal with state-owned corporations, which dominate swaths of the economy — often inefficiently, sometimes corruptly — according to the Chinese businessman close to senior officials.

“They have become a very powerful group, and many of the senior managers are senior party officials themselves,” said Mr. Huang, the economist, speaking of state-owned enterprises, known as SOEs. “We’re not going to see outright privatization of SOEs any time soon, but that’s to be expected.”

China’s previous leader, Hu Jintao, vowed economic changes at a Central Committee meeting a decade ago, but he squandered chances to act on those vows, many economists and, in private, quite a few officials say. If Mr. Xi does the same, the risks will be worse, analysts said. The room for easy growth in China is tapering off as the population of cheap labor ages and shrinks, and land and natural resources become costlier.

But another fear is that the government could act too hastily, removing state controls on the financial system before more market-driven growth has time to kick in, said Professor Tao of Renmin University. Rash moves in the finance sector could expose and exacerbate the debt-related problems of state-run companies and local governments, he said.

“If financial reforms are started first without real sectoral reforms, then you don’t get new sources of growth, and you could make asset bubbles even worse,” Professor Tao said. “This system is already fragile.”


Neil Gough contributed reporting.
 

Suikoguy

I whinny my fervor lowly, for his length is not as great as those of the Hylian war stallions
Thanks numble for the updates.

Interesting that the ended up backing down, it will be interesting to see if the higher interest rates do much.
 

Ether_Snake

安安安安安安安安安安安安安安安
So how do you explain these actions if you don't think they care? Why did they engage in market reforms after 1979? There is speculation from NYT's Bill Bishop that they're going to take a look at which institutions were in the most stress on Thursday, and punish the heads of the worst off: https://twitter.com/niubi/status/347927330829791232
https://twitter.com/niubi/status/347927552293232640

Unlike the US, executives that are reckless often face the death penalty.

I don't see how a crash is inevitable when they triggered these artificial stresses well before banks reached Lehman-like levels of credit reliance.

They will never execute a banking executive.
 

East Lake

Member
Poorly regulated wealth management products that in a worse case scenario are a couple steps away from a Madoff like Ponzi scheme fueled by constantly rolling over credit, some critics also compare them to the collateralized debt obligations:
Right but lets say I'm the client who wants a wealth management product for a certain return. What kind of assets are they rolling into these things? The reuters link sorta gets into it but not much.
 

numble

Member
Right but lets say I'm the client who wants a wealth management product for a certain return. What kind of assets are they rolling into these things? The reuters link sorta gets into it but not much.
In the worst case scenario, they raise the funds by selling more wealth management products and/or depending on short-term lending to pay the return. And then they get more loans and sell more wealth management products to pay the loans back and WMP interest when they become due.
 

Sou

Member
It seems like many people have a difficult time seeing what this means.

Here is an overly simplified example.
Imagine the economy as a Jenga tower, where the higher you build, the bigger the economy. You can pile new block on top, or pull from the bottom to build up.

Pulling blocks is like borrowing money.
As long as people only pull the middle block and build up, you can continue to build a huge tower safely. This is managing risk for the future, but pulling the middle blocks means you have less available block to pull.

On the other hand, pulling the blocks out from the side, allows you to build faster, but you risk a very unstable tower in the future. This is badly managed risk taking.

During the lehman crisis in the US, people were constantly taking maximum risk, with no action was taken when the tower was shaking back and forth on the brink of collapse, people kept on pulling as much as they can and piling to the top, and eventually it collapsed with no way back

What China is doing is that, normally, the jenga tower doesn't shake until it is on the brink of collapse. At a stage where it has yet to do that, the government is deliberately shaking the tower, showing everyone that if you keep on doing what you are doing, its going to collapse. The objective is to strike fear into all the players, once that is accomplished, they stop shaking the tower, and hopefully all the players will understand the impact of their actions, and will resume building, but in a less risky manner.
 

Sou

Member
They will never execute a banking executive.

.....

You need to understand that bank executives in China are mostly pawns of the community party. The market became this way because the government guided it on this path.

The ones that disobeys and do not execute their objectives correctly or abused their powers are eliminated in the most absolute manner as posted above.
 

Lonely1

Unconfirmed Member
Aaaaannnndddd... this is why the currency my savings are devalued while I'm living overseas. F**** you, China. :/
 
What PBoC is doing is somewhat similar to what Greenspan did when he started raising the interest rate to cool down the economy. It's just that when he did it, the ARMs started reseting and he destroyed America's banking system by inflicting terrible damage through it by causing massive subprime losses. The Chinese are attempting to curb speculative risky lending by severlely increasing short term interest rates. They're not really doing this in the traditional way of slowly doing it, but rather shockingly fast over night and this is what's causing the percieved panic. They'll probably clean out a portion of ultra risky lending out of the system with this strategy, it's just that they have to be careul not to destroy the entire system like what Greenspan did.
 

Wynnebeck

Banned
It seems like many people have a difficult time seeing what this means.

Here is an overly simplified example.
Imagine the economy as a Jenga tower, where the higher you build, the bigger the economy. You can pile new block on top, or pull from the bottom to build up.

Pulling blocks is like borrowing money.
As long as people only pull the middle block and build up, you can continue to build a huge tower safely. This is managing risk for the future, but pulling the middle blocks means you have less available block to pull.

On the other hand, pulling the blocks out from the side, allows you to build faster, but you risk a very unstable tower in the future. This is badly managed risk taking.

During the lehman crisis in the US, people were constantly taking maximum risk, with no action was taken when the tower was shaking back and forth on the brink of collapse, people kept on pulling as much as they can and piling to the top, and eventually it collapsed with no way back

What China is doing is that, normally, the jenga tower doesn't shake until it is on the brink of collapse. At a stage where it has yet to do that, the government is deliberately shaking the tower, showing everyone that if you keep on doing what you are doing, its going to collapse. The objective is to strike fear into all the players, once that is accomplished, they stop shaking the tower, and hopefully all the players will understand the impact of their actions, and will resume building, but in a less risky manner.

Thanks for the explanation.
 

numble

Member
Great analogy by Sou.

Another long-term analysis by The Atlantic/Chinafile:

http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/how-serious-is-the-coming-china-slowdown/277126/

How Serious Is the Coming China Slowdown?
Not very -- at least not yet. But the risk of a steeper decline is there.


The recent gyrations on the Chinese inter-bank market underscore that the chief risk to global growth now comes from China. Make no mistake: credit policy will tighten substantially in the coming months, as the government tries to push loan growth from its current rate of 20 percent down to something much closer to the rate of nominal GDP growth, which is about half that. Moreover, in the last few months of the year the new government will likely start concrete action on some long-deferred structural reforms. These reforms will bolster China's medium-term growth prospects, but the short-term impact will be tough for the economy and for markets.

The combination of tighter credit and structural reforms means that with the best of luck China could post GDP growth in 2014 of a bit over 6 percent, its weakest showing in 15 years and well below most current forecasts. A policy mistake such as excessive monetary tightening could easily push growth below the 6 percent mark. Banks and corporations appear finally to be getting the message that the new government, unlike its predecessor, will not support growth at some arbitrary level through investment stimulus.
The dire performance of China's stock markets in the past two weeks reflects this growing realization among domestic investors, although we suspect stocks have further to fall before weaker growth is fully discounted.

But the China risk is mainly of a negative growth shock, not financial Armageddon as some gloomier commentary suggests. Financial crisis risk remains relatively low because the system is closed and the usual triggers are unavailable. Emerging market financial crises usually erupt for one of two reasons: a sudden departure of foreign creditors or a drying-up of domestic funding sources for banks. China has little net exposure to foreign creditors and runs a large current account surplus, so there is no foreign trigger. And until now, banks have funded themselves mainly from deposits at a loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) of under 80 percent, although the increased use of quasi-deposit wealth management products means the true LDR may be a bit higher, especially for smaller banks. The danger arises when banks push up their LDRs and increasingly fund themselves on the wholesale market. So a domestic funding trigger does not exist -- yet.

The People's Bank of China (PBC) clearly understands the systemic risk of letting banks run up lending based on fickle wholesale funding. This is why it put its foot down last week and refused to pump money into the straitened interbank market. Its message to banks is clear: lend within your means. This stance raises confidence that Beijing will not let the credit bubble get out of control. But it also raises the odds that both credit and economic growth will slow sharply in the coming 6-12 months.


If the economy slows and local stock markets continue to tumble, doesn't this mean the RMB will also weaken sharply? Not necessarily. Beijing has a long-term policy interest in increasing the international use of the RMB, which can only occur if the currency earns a reputation as a reliable store of value in good times and bad. Allowing a sharp devaluation now runs against this interest, and also would be a sharp break from a long-established policy of not resorting to devaluation to stimulate growth, even at moments of severe stress (as in 1997-98 and 2008-09). So while our call on China growth has been marked down, our call on the RMB has not.

From a broader perspective, the biggest China risk is not that the country suffers a year or two of sharply below-trend growth. If that slowdown reflects more rational credit allocation and the early, painful stages of productivity-enhancing reforms, it will be healthy medicine. And even a much slower China will still be growing faster than all developed markets and most emerging ones.

The real risk is rather that the new government will show a lack of nerve or muscle and fail to push through financial sector liberalization, deregulation of markets to favor private firms, and fiscal reforms to curtail local governments' ability to prop up failing firms, overspend on infrastructure, and inflate property bubbles. The old government wasted the last three years of its term doing none of these things despite the obvious need. The new leaders are talking a better game, but they have a year at most to articulate a clear reform program, begin implementation (liberalizing interest rates and freeing electricity prices would be a good start), and ruthlessly removing senior officials who stand in the way. If they fail to deliver, then the short-term slowdown could become a long and dismal decline.
 

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China’s Very Real Slowdown, Out in the Open - WSJ

China’s economy is slowing down. China reported that both exports and imports fell in June, something that hadn’t happened since October 2009 during the depths of the global recession.

With second-quarter GDP due next week, there’s a very real risk that the report will miss targets, and what’s becoming clear is that China, considered by many the engine of global growth in the post-recession period, is grinding down.

The new Chinese leadership faces quite a challenge. They’re trying to contain a real-estate market that’s widely perceived as being in a bubble; they’re trying to squeeze a “shadow” banking system, and they’re trying to avoid the social unrest that comes with weakening growth.

The trade report may have surprised some, but it really just tacks on to a slowdown that’s structural rather than cyclical and been gathering steam for two years, Jian Chang at Barclay’s noted.

The latest news raises the odds of a “temporary, sharp slowdown in growth,” she wrote in a note. The interbank liquidity squeeze that began in June, along with the fact that government “has neither the appetite nor the capacity” for a big stimulus program means the risks to GDP forecasts “remain to the downside.”

“Some type of hard landing in China appears unavoidable, although it is difficult to pinpoint the timing or trigger,” she wrote.

The reaction in the markets was textbook Wall Street, even if it occurred half a world away: Stocks in China (up 2%) and Hong Kong (up 1%) “perversely” rose UBS' UBSN.VX -0.42% Art Cashin noted, with traders expecting the bad news might force the People’s Bank of China to back off its hardline stance of the past few weeks.

As far back as March, observers saw there was a real problem with China’s export numbers. But infamously opaque Chinese data made it hard to see from the outside. With the government cracking down, though, the weakness is getting dragged out into the open.

“The decline suggests a significant portion of Chinese foreign trade was actually false invoicing used to move hot money in and out of the country to skirt currency rules,” FTN Financial economist Chris Low wrote. “A crackdown by the government has revealed weakness in trade significant enough to affect GDP growth.” That crackdown was also partially responsible for the liquidity squeeze that began in June, he said.

The China picture reflects the slowdown in Europe, and a slowdown inside China as well. The effects, though, may be felt sharply in other emerging market economies, although not necessarily among China’s closest neighbors. “The biggest losers are likely to be the major commodity-producing [emerging markets], most of which lie in Latin America, the Middle East and parts of Africa,” Neil Shearing, Capital Economics’ chief emerging markets economist, wrote. Moreover, countries that haven’t saved up the commodities windfall – he singled out South Africa, Zambia, Chile and Peru – are the most exposed.

http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/07/10/chinas-very-real-slowdown-out-in-the-open/
 
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